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T
here has been no recent shortage of
commentary on conflicts of interest in
mutual fund management.1 From Eliot
Spitzer to Warren Buffett, from the
halls of Congress to investor discus-
sion boards, the mutual fund industry
has been under attack. What began in September
2003 as revelations of improprieties regarding pric-
ing calculations and trading deadlines has now
evolved into scrutiny of soft-dollar arrangements,
manager compensation, governance structure, and
the level of mutual fund fees. Given that this is the
first real scandal that the industry has experienced,
it is somewhat surprising to see the “rush to regula-
tion” that has followed. But this is a post-Enron
world. The U.S. House of Representatives has
already passed the Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee
Transparency Act of 2003, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering ten
new rules covering almost all aspects of mutual
fund pricing and operations, and the similarly wide-
ranging Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004 is now
before the U.S. Senate.
The motivation behind this flurry of activity is
clear: protecting the interests of 95 million mutual
fund shareholders. But how will investors really be
affected by the current scandals and future regula-
tory changes? My goal in this paper is to address
this question by stepping back from the details of
particular settlements or proposals and instead
beginning with an economist’s view of the relation-
ship between investors and their mutual fund
managers. On the basis of this conceptual charac-
terization of the agency problems inherent in mutual
fund management, the analysis then considers
potential solutions, from compensation-based fee
structures to fund governance to disclosure. Along
the way, it is of the utmost importance to strive
to understand current business practices (for
instance, soft-dollar arrangements), whom they
benefit, and why they exist. Only with this knowl-
edge can we rigorously contemplate how regulatory
changes might affect investors and advisory firms
and answer the question posed in the title: Are mutual
funds going to be a temporary problem, easily fixed,
or a permanent (regulatory) morass?
Whose Money Is It Anyway?
M
utual funds are registered with the SEC as
open-end investment companies and are regu-
lated by the Investment Company Act (ICA) of 1940
(and its amendments in 1970 and 2001). As the
name suggests, mutual funds are companies that
exist to pool the investment capital of a large num-
ber of investors. As with other companies, mutual
funds are wholly owned by the investors, or share-
holders. In contrast to traditional firms, however,
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how they are legally organized. Unlike the scenario
outlined above, mutual funds are started by a
sponsor money management firm that will act as
the investment adviser. Frequently, companies
affiliated with the investment adviser will also pro-
vide the additional services. While the investors
have the power to terminate the advisory contract,
they rarely do so.3 It is strange to even contem-
plate that Alliance investors, irritated with the
market timing in their fund, would replace Alliance
and the fund would become, say, an American
Century fund. When adviser changes do occur, it is
at the behest of the adviser through subadviser
contracts or fund mergers. Indeed, mutual funds
are treated as assets of the advisory firm in such
situations (not legally but conceptually). Thus, in
practice, a mutual fund is more of a shell, set up
and managed by the sponsor firm.
The view of investor as customer also receives
some weight from the fact that investors can redeem
their mutual fund shares at net asset value at any
time. This feature makes investing in a mutual fund
unlike owning stock in a traditional company or a
closed-end investment company, where the price at
which an investor can liquidate reflects the market’s
perception of the firm’s management. In that case,
when management is revealed to have taken a “bad”
action, current investors are damaged because they
can resell their shares only at a much lower price. In
contrast, when open-end mutual fund advisers are
found, or even perceived, to be “in the wrong,” each
investor can make his or her own choice about
whether managers should continue to provide ser-
vices, and there is no further damage. The ability to
liquidate shares at net asset value also effectively
eliminates any need for mutual fund investors to
initiate or even participate in proxy fights to oust
directors or oppose fund mergers, and, indeed, they
very infrequently do so. The ability to move money
around is an investor’s greatest protection and pri-
mary source of power in prompting the market to
provide the services he or she desires (a subject
discussed in a later section).
On the one hand, the answer to the question,
whose money is it? may be irrelevant. Advisers have
an incentive to maximize their own profit while
investors are trying to maximize returns, and these
two objectives will, in general, be in conflict. On the
other hand, the answer to the question is central
because it will influence how we think about regu-
lation. (The reader may find it helpful to refer to
Figure 2 during the following discussion of fund
fees and conflicts of interest.) If investors are
viewed as owners, they can more easily claim a
profit from selling a product or service in the mar-
ketplace. Their reason for existence is to take
advantage of mutual investment to provide diversi-
fied portfolios to shareholders at a lower cost than
they could achieve on their own.
Theoretically, we can imagine a mutual fund as an
organization in which a group of shareholders form
the fund and meet periodically to decide on the
investment strategy.2 In practice, of course, this is
not the case. Mutual funds contract with an invest-
ment adviser to make portfolio decisions and with
outside service providers for record keeping, transfer
agent services, underwriting, and so forth. Legally,
mutual funds are independent of the advisory firm
and could change investment advisers if a majority of
the shareholders or directors approved such a move.
From this legal organization it follows that an
advisory firm is acting in a custodial fashion with
respect to shareholder assets and as such has a
fiduciary duty to make decisions in the best inter-
ests of shareholders. Indeed, the idea that funds
manage shareholder assets underlies most of the
rhetoric surrounding the recent mutual fund scan-
dals. In particular, the call for more disclosure of
fund expenses, holdings, and manager compensa-
tion is based on the idea that it is the shareholders’
money that is being spent and invested.
From a somewhat different perspective, the
investor can be seen not as an owner but as a cus-
tomer (see Figure 1). In this view, the adviser is
merely another service provider, similar to a
mechanic or a general contractor. After talking with
many people in the course of preparing this paper, I
have realized that this view is implicitly taken by
many mutual fund shareholders themselves. They
do not think of themselves as owners of a firm but
rather as clients, purchasing investment returns. In
their minds, Magellan is Fidelity’s fund, operated by
Fidelity to provide them with investment manage-
ment services.
This view makes more sense when we examine
how mutual funds are typically run rather than
The ability to move money around is an
investor’s greatest protection and primary
source of power in prompting the market to
provide the services he or she desires.1. For a comprehensive collection of Wall Street Journal articles and editorials on the evolving scandals, see “Mutual Funds
Under Scrutiny” at www.wsj.com. A complete and updated list of funds under investigation, settlements, and fund responses
to the scandal can be found at www.morningstar.com.
2. Such organizations are known as investment clubs and are exempt from the ICA under the private investment company
exception in section 3(c)(1) provided they have fewer than 100 members and do not plan to issue securities to the public.
3. Tufano and Sevick (1997) report that they know of only three cases in which a mutual fund terminated its advisory contract
with the sponsor firm.
3 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
“right” to more information about how their money
is managed. If funds are viewed as service
providers, then investors already have much of the
information (in performance records) that they
need to make a decision about which fund to hire.
To investors, it is the net return performance that
matters, and, if they believe they can do better, they
will move their money elsewhere. The advisers’ fees
in this case are in a sense irrelevant: Investors
invest their money and earn a net return on it, and
this return is the total value of the service.
A simple analogy makes the point more directly.
When I take my car to the Ford dealer to fix the radi-
ator, I ask the price and then perform the economic
calculus to determine (1) if a repaired radiator is
worth that price in forgone consumption and (2) if I
believe that I could get a better price from another
shop since doing so would give me a larger net ben-
efit (equal to the value of the fixed radiator minus
the price of repair). Analogously, investors do not
pay an explicit price for investment management
services; they receive the net benefit itself and then
determine whether it is positive and whether it is
dominated by another investment option. In this
case, investors do not need or necessarily even want
to know about transactions costs or soft dollars or
exactly how many dollars they are paying in fees
because all of these are netted out already when
they view their return. That is not to say that such
information might not be helpful for other reasons.
Security returns are quite noisy, and, to the extent
that expense ratios are relatively constant, they may
provide investors with a useful predictor of which
funds are likely to post better net performance in
the future. In addition, other pieces of information,
such as portfolio holdings, certainly could be benefi-
cial, but investors’ claims to that information are not
as powerful when investors are viewed as cus-
tomers. This perception is in contrast to the view of
investors as owners, where the gross return on the
investment portfolio is theirs and any fees paid out
of that is taking away some of their money.
These two opposing perspectives are important
when discussing issues such as fee levels and the
FIGURE 1
Investor As Owner versus Investor As Customer
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low fees and satisfied investors. But its experience,
rather than serving as proof that an alternative orga-
nizational structure would solve the fundamental
agency problem, seems instead to be proof that there




uch of the response to last autumn’s mutual
fund scandals has focused, somewhat tangen-
tially, on fund fees, which were not part of the
alleged misconduct. In particular, many people have
expressed dismay that the massive growth of the
mutual fund industry, combined with the assump-
tion of economies of scale, has not delivered drasti-
cally lower fees.6 To view fee levels as an example of
a “conflict of interest” is certainly reasonable using
the traditional sense of the term. The fund adviser,
when viewed as having a fiduciary responsibility to
the investor/owners, certainly has interests that
conflict. He wants to maximize his own profit yet
has a duty to act only in the best interests of
investors. This observation illustrates the adage that
“a man cannot serve two masters” and gives rise to
the concern about fees that benefit the adviser at
the expense of investors.
In line with the discussion in the previous sec-
tion, I adopt a different definition of conflict of
interest in which it is the interests of the adviser
potential increased regulation or elimination of soft
dollars or 12b-1 fees.4 But, as noted, there are
inherent conflicts between investors and advisers
regardless of which view is held. Whether investors
are owners or customers, there exists an agency
problem in which an investment adviser, the agent,
can take unobservable actions that will affect the
output going to the investor, the principal.
Indeed, in many cases the adviser has another
set of principals to be concerned with: the investors
in the advisory firm, be it public or private. They
want to maximize the profit of the advisory firm and
are the group that sets the compensation package
of the individual investment manager used by each
fund. There is one firm that does not serve two such
masters: Vanguard Group. The shareholders of the
advisory firm, Vanguard Group, are the Vanguard
mutual funds themselves. One might be tempted to
infer that the conflict between adviser and investor
could be eliminated if other firms adopted this
structure. But, operationally, this outcome is not
clear. Such an advisory firm would charge the funds
for advisory services at cost, as Vanguard does, but
the officers of the advisory firm would largely deter-
mine that cost. This structure most closely resem-
bles that of a mutual savings bank. The question is,
who will discipline the advisory firm under this
structure?5 I want to make it clear that I am not tak-
ing issue with Vanguard itself, which is known for its
FIGURE 2
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➤4. 12b-1 fees are paid out of fund assets to market or distribute fund shares. The predominant use of 12b-1 fees is to compen-
sate brokers for selling fund shares. “Soft dollars” refers to the practice of paying full price for stock trade execution and
receiving research for free in return.
5. Rasmusen (1988) discusses the relative benefits of stock versus mutual banks, concluding that in many cases the mutual
banks will be less efficient. Hermalin and Wallace (1994) test the efficiency of stock-owned banks versus mutual banks and
find that, controlling for lines of business, stock banks are more efficient and more likely to remain solvent. This finding does
not imply that mutual ownership of advisory firms will necessarily induce inefficiencies, but, given the research on banks, it
is a distinct possibility. 
6. Whether or not fees have declined is not central to my argument, but I do believe a good case can be made that both loads
and operating expenses have indeed fallen over the past twenty years. See Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2004).
7. In the discussion that follows, many of the decisions will be made by the fund manager, an employee of the advisory firm. To
simplify this analysis, and because little is known about manager compensation, I assume that fund managers act in the inter-
est of the advisory firm. This assumption is not unreasonable since an employee’s wages will in general be designed to align
the employee’s incentives with the maximization of firm profit. Calls for more transparency regarding manager compensation
have been increasing lately, and this information, if disclosed, could add another layer to the analysis of conflicts of interest. 
8. Many academic papers assume decreasing returns to scale, including Berk and Green (2002), while practitioners point to the
difficulty of outperforming the market when fund size increases.
9. Thus it is not necessarily true as some (including Money magazine) suggest, that fund closures represent an instance of an
advisory firm forgoing its own profits to secure high returns for fund shareholders.
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and the investors that are in conflict. I view the
adviser as having one, and only one, reasonable
objective: to maximize his or her own profit. My def-
inition is then roughly synonymous to the notion of
an agency problem in the relationship between
advisers and investors. And, under this definition,
conflicts of interest apply no matter what view of
investors you may hold (that is, owners or cus-
tomers). By extension, however, I do not include
the setting of fees as an example of a conflict of
interest because investors can observe their net
return after fees so that the fee charged is not in
any sense a hidden action on the part of the adviser.
Indeed, advisers can be predicted to charge the fee
that will maximize their profit, given investor demand
for mutual funds and their cost structure for sup-
plying these services. And this fee, or course, is pos-
itive and larger than the zero price investors would
like to pay for these services. But suppliers and
demanders will conflict in this way in any market for
services. I believe the question of the level of fees
can more appropriately be addressed by studying
the characteristics of investor decision making, an
issue taken up later in the paper.
The conflict between investors and advisers,
then, occurs because the two parties will in general
have differing objectives. The investors would like
the agent to invest their money to maximize their
investment objective. Typically, investors are mod-
eled as valuing higher returns but disliking risk.
This model leads to a simple investment objective of
maximizing returns for given levels of risk, or choos-
ing portfolios on the efficient frontier. In practice,
this model is often extended to include investor
hedging demands and other components of their
portfolio so that they seek maximum risk-adjusted
performance within a given style or asset class. The
investment adviser, as the agent, desires to maxi-
mize her own profit and would prefer not to exert
much effort (that is, cost) in fulfilling her role.7
While there is little empirical understanding of
the underlying cost structure of advisory firms, fea-
tures of their revenue generation can be observed.
The standard contract in the mutual fund industry
compensates the investment adviser with a percent-
age of assets under management (AUM). In many
fund families, this amount is modified by reducing
the fee percentage as AUM reaches various break
points. In a few funds (only 1.7 percent), an explicit
component ties adviser compensation to perfor-
mance relative to a passive benchmark (see Elton,
Gruber, and Blake 2003). In the interest of simplic-
ity, this discussion will concentrate on a fixed-
percentage fee contract. Under this compensation
scheme, an adviser has an incentive to grow AUM.
This objective can be achieved by taking actions
that will increase new asset flow to the fund and/or
increase the return earned on existing assets. This
incentive to increase AUM will continue without
bound if there are constant returns to scale in advi-
sory services, and advisers would not ever seek to
close a fund. If, as some argue, there are decreasing
returns to scale beyond a certain point, there will in
fact be an optimal scale for the fund from the adviser’s
perspective.8 The adviser would have an incentive
to close the fund once its assets reached this level.9
It is important to note that the form of the fee com-
pensation to advisers is already a step toward mini-
mizing conflicts of interest. The current contract
induces an explicit incentive on the part of advisers to
post good performance. This incentive is reinforced
by the empirical fact that the flow of new assets from6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
Chinese equities. And the diversification rule would
make a manager liable for the extreme action of
putting all assets into one stock. However, the unsur-
prising result of this rule is that fund names chosen
by advisory firms are largely uninformative with
respect to issues of investment allocation within
asset classes.10 Thus, the rule does nothing to stop a
manager from shifting the risk-return profile toward
his preferred level (that is, all in stocks as the name
claims, but in, say, technology stocks alone).
Gaming investor flow patterns. The incen-
tives to alter portfolio risk away from investor pref-
erences can also arise from investors’ flow allocation
patterns. The more we learn about the dynamics of
fund flow, the more specific incentives we can map
out for advisers. Here are two examples based on
well-established investor flow patterns.
Evidence suggests that investors use style cate-
gories to make investment decisions.11 For example, a
typical allocation decision might be limited to choos-
ing among growth funds or selecting the best small-
cap value fund. Given this tendency to sort funds into
style groups, advisers might find it profitable to
“game” the classification system. In a nutshell, advis-
ers would market themselves as one style while pur-
suing another portfolio strategy in which expected
returns are higher. As the example above shows, this
strategy can be easily pursued without violating the
ICA as long as the fund name and prospectus state-
ment are vague enough. Such a strategy will improve
an adviser’s chance of outperforming rivals within his
stated style and thus attracting new assets. Empirical
research has found evidence of such gaming. For
example, Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) report
a correlation of 0.7 between past and future styles for
all funds as a group, with style changes occurring
most frequently among poorly performing funds. A
well-known example of style shifting occurred in
Fidelity Magellan in the fall of 1995, when fund man-
ager Jeffrey Vinik allocated nearly 20 percent of the
fund’s assets to fixed income. Unfortunately for him,
the bet went bad, and Magellan’s subsequent poor
performance cost the fund assets and Vinik his job. In
this case, investors learned of the shift through
Magellan’s poor performance over the next several
months. Even if Vinik’s bet had paid off, many
investors were concerned that he was essentially tim-
ing the market, which was not what they hired him
for. Such style drift still happens today.12
Since the initial analysis of the convex, winner-
take-all nature of the mutual fund flow tournament,
researchers have investigated whether fund man-
agers take on additional risk when they find them-
selves underperforming their competitors midyear,
retail investors is largely driven by performance. The
fee structure implies that advisers have no incentive
to take any actions that reduce performance without
a source of countervailing profit. For example, while
the fee decreases net performance and future AUM,
advisers have an incentive to increase fees because
the reduction in future AUM is more than offset by
a higher fee percentage.
So what are the conflicts of interest that lie at the
root of the investor-adviser relationship? Certainly
the market-timing and late trading charges that sur-
faced in 2003 are the most visible examples. But the
potential for other problems exists as well. This sec-
tion proposes a simple typology of the potential
conflicts of interest in mutual fund management in
order to provide some structure to the analysis of
possible regulatory solutions.
Unequal risk tolerance. If the risk tolerances of
fund investors and the advisory firm differ, the adviser
has an incentive to pursue a different risk-return
strategy than would be optimal for investors. Consider
the simple example of a risk-neutral adviser and risk-
averse investors—a reasonable assumption when the
advisory firm is a publicly traded corporation. The
adviser, maximizing expected profit, would maximize
expected return and give no consideration to the
riskiness of this strategy. In the limit, he might even
be tempted to invest only in the one stock that he
perceives to have the highest expected return.
Several ICA rules appear to be attempts to
address this type of risk alteration and make the
most extreme forms of it illegal. Section 13(a) pro-
hibits a fund from becoming nondiversified or to
deviate from any statement regarding policy made
in the prospectus while rule 35d-1 states that fund
names that suggest investment in a particular type of
asset must have at least 80 percent of their holdings
in accordance with the asset type or geographic loca-
tion mentioned in the name. These rules act to limit
fund managers’ ability to claim to be one type of fund
and then implement another strategy—for example,
the ABC Fixed Income fund invests predominately in
Advisers have an incentive to maximize their
own profit while investors are trying to maxi-
mize returns, and these two objectives will,
in general, be in conflict.10. Funds do generally find it worthwhile to identify themselves according to asset class—equity, fixed income, etc. 
11. See Del Guercio and Tkac (2003). Flow to a style category is a significant determinant of individual fund flow. Also see
Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
12. For examples of recent style drift, see Wolper (2004). 
13. Sirri and Tufano (1998) first documented the convex nature of the cross-section of mutual fund flows.
14. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that managers shift the riskiness of their portfolios
midyear while Busse (2001) and Koski and Pontiff (1999) argue that the empirical relationship between performance and risk is
driven by methodology or mechanically by flows. Chen and Pennacchi (2000) provide an alternative test based on tracking error.
15. See Romano (2002) for a survey of the literature on proxy voting, institutional ownership, and the impact of implementing
confidential voting. The most direct tests, using actual shareholder votes, have not found that financial institutions are more
likely to vote with management than nonrelated shareholders or that financial institution voting behavior is changed in the
presence of confidential voting. 
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as the incentives of the tournament would sug-
gest.13 With this pattern of flow allocations, advisers
of funds in the top few performance percentiles of
returns have an incentive to reduce risk for the
remaining period and solidify their lead while advis-
ers of less successful funds have an incentive to
increase risk in an attempt to move up in the final
rankings. Since the existing empirical evidence on
this issue is mixed, the jury is still out on whether
such risk shifting is economically significant.14 My
guess is that we do not yet have a detailed enough
understanding of flow patterns to conduct powerful
tests of manager allocations and incentives.
The real harm of any of these risk-shifting actions
is that they expose investors to additional risk or to a
different type of risk without their knowledge. SEC
disclosure rules require mutual fund managers to
report their holdings semiannually, but aside from
these two snapshots, investors in many funds do not
know the magnitude and style of their manager’s tilt.
However, the advent of independent style catego-
rization by firms such as Morningstar has reduced
the gains to gaming because advisers cannot self-
determine the style category in which they will be com-
pared. In addition, as in the Magellan case, analyzing
fund returns over relatively short periods of time can
identify some dramatic changes in style or risk.
Cross-subsidization. As noted above, no adviser
would have an incentive to take actions to reduce
the performance of a fund without having an offset-
ting increase in profit. The fact that advisory firms
set up multiple mutual funds of various styles and
serve different clienteles (individuals, hedge funds,
and corporate clients) provides an opportunity for
cross-subsidization of profits.
The opportunity for cross-subsidization of advi-
sory firm profits across funds sponsored by the adviser
was behind a great deal of the much-publicized mar-
ket timing and late trading agreements. Advisory
firms allowed high-frequency trading in some funds
in return for parking assets in other funds. Before the
agreement was discovered, it cost the advisory firm
some small performance drag via dilution in the
timed funds while it received as revenue the man-
agement fee on the new assets in the other funds.
Without the ability to collect the management fees on
these other investments, the fund company would
receive little or no benefit from allowing the timing.
Indeed, in the cases where there has been no offset-
ting benefit to the advisory firm, the timing appears
to have occurred by flying under the radar of their
monitoring systems (for example, timing trades were
bundled with other trades and so were not identifi-
able by the advisory firm when they were received).
The various client types that mutual fund advisory
firms court and serve also provide an opportunity for
cross-subsidization. In addition to more traditional
situations in which one arm of a firm is involved in
investment banking serving corporate clients while
another arm manages assets, the rise of defined con-
tribution and 401(k) plans means that mutual fund
advisers now actively solicit advisory business from
corporations—some, the very same corporations in
which they hold stock as part of mutual fund portfo-
lios. The adviser can use his shareholder voting
rights, typically on a shareholder or management
proposal, as a way to gain or keep a large corporate
client. Proposals to declassify the board of directors
or rescind a poison pill are believed to increase firm
value by strengthening the firm’s governance struc-
ture or removing hindrances in the market for corpo-
rate control. A vote with management against such a
proposal is then seen as decreasing value. 
As with the market timing agreements in which
hedge funds assets were the source of profit, the
advisory firm again faces a customer controlling a
large amount of assets. The termination of a 401(k)
contract would result in a large revenue loss while
the drag on fund performance, even if it causes a
decrease in fund flow, would likely be relatively
small. Thus, the potential for gain surely exists.
However, there is no evidence of widespread use of
voting rights in ways that decrease firm value and
harm investors.15 This lack of evidence may well be8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
funds imposes two types of costs on other share-
holders, and both such costs will hurt fund perfor-
mance in up markets. First is the additional cost of
managing the cash inflow and outflow associated
with the timing. Advisers might respond to this
increased volatility of flows by holding a larger cash
cushion, which will lower an equity fund’s return in
up markets. Alternatively, advisers might increase
transactions of the portfolio securities in order to
invest new money and fund redemptions. This
action, of course, imposes brokerage commissions
and price pressure costs on the entire portfolio.
Finally, an alternative way fund managers manage
flows is to contract for insurance in advance with
another party, which purchases or redeems shares
in order to smooth daily net cash flows.19 But as
with all insurance, there is a certain payment that is
exchanged for the protection from flow volatility,
and so the result is that even this method will
impose some cost on the portfolio.
The other component of the harm done to other
shareholders is a dilution effect. Market timers buy
shares in the fund when it is likely to increase in
value and sell their shares when it is likely to
decrease in value.20 Since the advisers cannot
immediately invest this additional flow in the under-
lying portfolio securities, the assets are held in cash,
at least for the short term. This cash holding dilutes
the value of previously purchased shares when the
timers have skill. This type of dilution naturally
occurs every day with the purchase and redemption
of fund shares. But unlike liquidity traders, whose
activity is uncorrelated with the return on the fund,
skillful market timers purchase before an up day
and sell before a down day and so decrease the
value of existing shares. Liquidity traders, on the
other hand, may purchase shares before a down
day, thus delivering a benefit to other shareholders
because the decline in the portfolio’s value is muted
by their contribution to the zero return cash posi-
tion. Because their trades are uncorrelated with
market movements, liquidity traders do not exert a
net dilution cost to other shareholders on average
and over longer holding periods.
The difficulty is measuring these costs occurs in
identifying the affected investors and attributing
costs to various trades. The very features of mutual
fund distribution that allowed some timers to avoid
detection by fund managers makes it costly to doc-
ument the shareholders of record as of each date on
which the timing trades occurred. Thus, identifying
fund owners would require cooperation and data
management across all fund distributors. To arrive
at a calculation of damage to these investors, a
attributable to the fact that, outside of immediate
corporate control events, both the cost in terms of
impact on stock value as well as the gain (pleasing
management) are small.16 Thus, any economically
significant damage is likely to occur only in the
relatively rare instances of a merger or hostile
takeover. Perhaps the most well known example of
such alleged action was the recent voting by
Deutsche Bank in the proposed merger of Hewlett-
Packard (HP) and Compaq.17 Future instances of
this type of behavior will be more easily identified
because funds are now required to make available
their proxy voting guidelines and records.
What’s the Harm?
I
n each of these cases, it is clear what the adviser
is gaining by engaging in these activities: addi-
tional revenue and profit. But what are fund
investors losing? What is the harm in the various
actions described above? In some cases it is an
opportunity cost and not an out-of-pocket cost. For
example, in the case of differing risk tolerances, the
manager might well take on a level of risk that is
suboptimal from an investor’s point of view. The
cost to investors here is one of expected utility
loss—an opportunity cost versus their optimal com-
bination of risk and expected return. To be sure,
such a cost is real to an economist. But it would be
difficult to measure or compensate primarily
because the notion of risk is an ex ante one. The
portfolio the manager chooses may expose the
investor to more risk than she would like, given the
expected return performance, but ex post might
experience a good outcome. In this case the
investor gains, ex post, versus the portfolio she
would have chosen, but the manager nonetheless
exposed her to what she perceived as an unaccept-
able level of risk. Harm has been done, but the dam-
ages are not easily quantifiable even though the
portfolios may be easily valued in dollar terms.18
In other cases, the costs to shareholders are
more easily quantified. Market timing using mutual
Many people have expressed dismay that the
massive growth of the mutual fund industry,
combined with the assumption of economies of
scale, has not delivered drastically lower fees.16. See Karpoff (1998) for a survey of the extensive literature on stock price reaction to shareholder activism. The majority of
research suggests that shareholder proposals have little or no impact on firm value. 
17. In 2003, the SEC imposed a $750,000 penalty on Deutsche Bank for not disclosing to its advisory clients that it was repre-
senting HP in the merger talks. Deutsche Bank Asset Management initially voted the proxies it controlled against the merger
but switched its vote after a presentation by HP and being informed that Deutsche Bank’s investment banking arm was
representing HP. See www.sec.gov/nrews/press/2003-100.htm. 
18. Several readers have suggested that, in this case, investors would not seek to recover damages because they care about addi-
tional risk only when the investment turns out badly.
19. ReFlow is one example of such an insurance provider; see www.reflow.com.
20. The damage done by late trading (that is, trades that were put in after 4:00 p.m.) is similar in that on days where postclose
news drives the value of the portfolio up, these favored traders will purchase shares and vice versa for news that will decrease
the value of underlying securities. 
21. With information available on individual investors’ trading histories, it may be relatively easy to classify certain trades as
timing trades. But should all purchases on a day that shows a great deal of timing activity be classified as timing related?
While the most profitable, and least risky, timing strategy is to trade frequently, the infrequent timer cannot be ruled out.
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determination must be made as to which trades
were timing trades in order to calculate what the
net asset value would have been the following day
without the timing purchases.21 Moreover, deter-
mining the amount of brokerage fees or additional
cash holdings or payments to smooth cash flow that
are the response to timing trades alone would likely
be a controversial task because each decision is the
result of multiple inputs and not a response to timing
alone. Further complicating matters are the down
markets during the 2000–02 period. Shareholders in
equity funds holding extra cash cushions because of
timing during this period were actually benefited by
the additional cash, not penalized. Indeed, the intri-
cacies of the calculations are reflected in the fact
that settlements with the SEC leave the calculation
of damages to be determined later.
Methods of Reducing Conflicts of Interest and
Proposed Legislation and Regulation
A
s noted above, some ICA and additional SEC
rules already address issues related to some of
the potential conflicts of interest. And violations of
existing rules such as late trading, allowing market
timers contrary to stated fund policy, and fund trad-
ing by individual managers have been uncovered
and are being prosecuted by states’ attorneys gen-
eral and the SEC. To the extent that advisory firm
employees now perceive a higher probability of
being caught (and receiving significant penalties
thereafter), the current scandal has its own deter-
rent effect on future misconduct. Indeed, advisory
firms have responded by implementing new pro-
grams to monitor fund trades in an attempt to
detect timing, by strengthening their stated policies
on market timing, and by disciplining or firing
employees (for example, fund managers) or forcing
them to resign. It seems safe to predict that this
particular brand of misconduct will not occur in the
future. But the underlying conflicts of interest and
potential for other types of misconduct still exist.
How might these conflicts be reduced?
Compensation-based solutions. Standard
principal-agent theory suggests that one avenue is
alignment of incentives via a compensation contract
between investors and advisers in which advisers are
paid on the basis of performance. To some extent,
this compensation-based method is already in place.
Advisory fees are paid as a percentage of assets
under management, and these assets grow both
through return performance and new asset flow. The
return performance is positively correlated with the
objective function of current shareholders while the
attraction of new assets is directly related to whether
the advisory firm succeeds in offering a product that
investors value. No compensation scheme is perfect,
however, and this case is no exception. As noted in
the previous section, there are still opportunities for
the manager to game the compensation system by
altering the risk of the portfolio.
Would more explicit performance-based fees help
solve the problem? The answer is no. Such a system
imposes the chosen benchmark index as a primary
objective for the management of the fund. The het-
erogeneity across investors makes any one bench-
mark unlikely to align the adviser’s objective with that
of each investor. The agency problem between one
advisory firm and thousands of investors cannot be
solved via compensation unless those investors are
fundamentally similar. More important, however,
is the observation that a variant of benchmarking is
already operating through fund flows. Aggregate flow
to funds in a given style has been found to be a sig-
nificant determinant of individual fund flow. Thus,
investors are indeed largely comparing funds within a
given style and allocating flow to the better perform-
ers. This form of comparison is further strengthened
by investors’ use of Morningstar ratings, which are10 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
Proposed regulations and legislation. Congress
and the SEC have suggested and are now consider-
ing various other remedies.23 Many of these would
reform mutual fund governance, emphasizing the
structure and activities of boards of directors.
Among the rules passed or up for comment at the
SEC are proposals to require an independent board
chairman, to increase the required percentage of
independent directors from 50 percent to 75 percent,
to provide independent directors with a staff, and to
require the board to conduct yearly self-evaluations
and report to investors on the reasonableness of
approved advisory fee contracts. The stated pur-
pose of the governance reforms is “to enhance the
independence and effectiveness of fund boards and
to improve their ability to protect the interests of the
funds and fund shareholders they serve” (SEC pro-
posed rule, Release No. IC-26323 at www.sec.gov).
This proposal presumes that the investors rely on
the fund board to provide protection from invest-
ment advisers. Clearly, the framework of investors
as owners is at the root of such regulation. Investors
as customers, with the ability to redeem assets at
net asset value, do not rely on board protection.
(Figure 3 illustrates the fundamental issue behind
these two approaches to fund monitoring.) It is
unclear that such reforms will provide them with any
benefit above and beyond what they can achieve
themselves. It is more likely that investors will not
value the monitoring because they have no long-
term interest that they cannot monitor themselves.
The fact that these proposals will also impose costs
on funds because they will require additional
staffing and the resources to compile yearly reports
means that investors will be worse off.24
Similar concerns about the cost to investors can
be raised regarding the proposed elimination of 12b-1
fees in the Mutual Fund Act of 2004. These fees are
not hidden actions by the advisory firm; they are
observed implicitly in the net performance earned
on fund shares and reported explicitly as part of the
expense ratio and in shareholder reports. Many aca-
demics have argued that these fees are a deadweight
loss for investors, but this argument misses the
point that 12b-1 fees are largely deferred payment
for brokerage services (Investment Company
Institute 2000). These brokerage services package
together investment advice, information, conve-
nience, and other intangibles, like reputation, that
are of value to investors. The elimination of 12b-1
fees would impose costs on investors via an impact
on the market for these services. Put succinctly,
these valuable services will continue to be demanded
and thus provided, and ultimately investors will
now style-based. Flows effectively recreate an implicit
performance fee, with the average fund in that style
as the benchmark to beat. The attractive feature of
the incentives induced by flows is that they are con-
stantly responsive to the preferences of investors in
the marketplace. If a new dimension of style becomes
important to investors (say, exchange rate exposure,
in addition to the popular capitalization and growth/
value distinctions), flows would begin accruing to
funds in relation to their performance along this
dimension as well. No explicit performance-based fee
can be as flexible to the demands of investors.
Separation of functions. Another alternative
that has seldom been proposed, but which can reduce
the conflict of interests attributable to the possibil-
ity of cross-subsidization, is a separation of func-
tions. This approach was a fundamental part of the
settlement between the SEC and investment banks
in 2003, under which the banks are required to sep-
arate the operations of their research and invest-
ment banking divisions.22 While not complete, since
the firms still perform both functions, the separa-
tion aims to eliminate communication between the
divisions so that the investment bankers cannot cre-
ate fraudulent research to support their business
deals. An analog in the mutual fund arena would be
to separate the advisory firms so that each advises
for only one fund or to disallow mutual fund advisory
firms from managing corporate retirement assets.
Both of these approaches would eliminate a poten-
tial conflict of interest, but neither is a reasonable
solution. The benefits of mutual fund investing
largely come from economies of scale in portfolio
management, underwriting, record keeping, and dis-
tribution. To force separation and scale reduction
would result in more costly service for investors in
both the retail and defined contribution market.
The fact that no separation-based regulation has
been proposed is a welcome sign that regulatory
authorities and legislators understand that, when
seeking to eliminate conflicts of interest, there are
some costs that are not worth paying.
To the extent that advisory firm employees
now perceive a higher probability of being
caught, the current scandal has its own
deterrent effect on future misconduct.22. The other well-known financial markets example of such separation of functions was the Glass-Steagall Act, which sepa-
rated investment and commercial banking. 
23. See www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml for current rule proposals at the SEC, Fitzgerald.senate.gov for the Mutual Fund
Reform Act of 2004, and www.baker.house.gov for the Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003. 
24. Interestingly, in 1980 the SEC proposed a modification in fund governance, the unified investment form, that would have done
away with fund boards and shareholder voting. Ultimately, the agency decided that such a move would leave shareholders
unprotected, the same argument used today to support increasing the functions of fund boards. See SEC (1992). 
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bear the cost. Two obvious possibilities that might
follow from the elimination of 12b-1 fees are
increases in management fees to advisory firms and
a shift to more fee-based broker-investor arrange-
ments. It is not possible to eliminate 12b-1 fees and
leave investors enjoying the same bundle of services
at a lower price.
It may be helpful to consider the analogous prac-
tice of slotting fees and promotional allowances in
the distribution of many consumer package goods,
such as soft drinks, cereal, yogurt, or soup. Payments
are made by manufacturers to wholesale and retail
distributors to acquire shelf space and to run sales
and other product promotions. In grocery stores,
shelf space is scarce, with over 100,000 products
competing for 40,000 slots in a typical store. It is no
surprise then that shelf space commands a positive
price in the form of slotting fees. In the mutual fund
industry, the constraint may not be a physical one on
mutual fund distribution space, but there certainly
is a scarcity of investor attention and interaction.
Thus we should not be surprised that resources will
flow to brokers and financial advisers who are the
point of contact for investors. But brokers operate
in a competitive environment, as do grocery stores.
In their own quest for customers, brokers supply a
variety of services that customers value. For gro-
cery stores this activity results in a natural foods
section, freshly made sushi, free recipe cards, and
samples of new products. Similarly, brokers offer
financial planning, information, and advice that both
reduce investor search costs and supply expertise
that many investors do not possess.
It is important to note that brokers will strive to
meet their customers’ demands just as retailers will
pull products that do not sell from the shelves and
replace them with products their customers prefer.
A system of 12b-1 fees to pay for distribution, or the
other arrangements made to obtain placement on
select lists, does not control the opportunity set of
funds that investors can choose from. Investor pref-
erences and demands continually drive the mix of
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underlying the use of soft dollars will serve to further
the discussion of their overall impact on investors.
First, to the extent that soft-dollar brokerage is
used to circumvent the NASD cap on 12b-1 fees and
compensate brokers for distribution of fund shares,
some fraction of soft-dollar expenditures can be
eliminated by a removal of this regulation. The other
use of soft dollars is to purchase research, both
independent and that produced by the brokerage
firms themselves. A common criticism of this prac-
tice is that investors have a right to know how the
advisory firm is spending their money. As noted ear-
lier, the view of investors as customers effectively
negates this line of inquiry and instead focuses on
the economic underpinnings of the provision of
advisory services.
The open question is, why do advisory firms fund
research using soft dollars? One possible answer is
that soft dollars are preferable since they are not
included in expense ratios. Firms can then “hide”
these costs from investors. But soft dollars do cause
a drag on net performance. And, as we shall see in
the next section, investors make decisions based on
performance and not expense ratios. So it is difficult
to see what incentive advisers have to overspend
on research. Is there then an economic rationale
behind soft-dollar arrangements? Indeed, several
potential economic scenarios could explain the
existence of soft dollars.
Soft dollars are essentially tying agreements.
Brokerage firms charge mutual fund advisers for
a package including both trade execution and
research services rather than pricing each compo-
nent separately. Firms can use tying to price discrim-
inate when they face heterogeneous customers or
to try to deter the entry of potential competitors.
Additionally, tying can be an efficient outcome when
there are production complementarities—when the
cost of producing both goods is lower than the sum
of the cost of producing them separately. Finally,
tying may be the equilibrium result of a competitive
game in which firms add products in an attempt to
differentiate themselves from rivals.
Which of these reasons is likely behind soft-dollar
usage by mutual fund advisers? A thorough study
would require in-depth institutional knowledge of
the soft-dollar agreements and data on their usage
across the industry that is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, I think the most plausible explana-
tion, given my current knowledge, is that soft dol-
lars are the result of brokerage firms’ competition to
differentiate. To the extent that some brokerage
firms can offer proprietary research, they will have
some monopoly power. But any tying of outside
products and services in the marketplace. An exam-
ple of recent innovation in this arena is the 12b-1 fee
rebate program currently offered by E*Trade.
E*Trade has a built a business catering to price-
sensitive retail investors, and now this price compe-
tition has been extended to mutual funds.
Thus, investors who choose to purchase mutual
funds through brokers pay for the valuable services
through 12b-1 fees. But what of the fact that most
broker-sold mutual funds offer various share classes,
each with a different combination of loads and 12b-1
fees? All of these investors are receiving the services
of the broker. Is there an inequity lurking here in
that some investors pay more than others? There is
no inequity if we correctly view the current system
of multiple share classes as a rich collection of pric-
ing options. Depending on their investment horizon
(not just their long-term horizon but their expected
horizon in that fund), investors will find themselves
better off in different share classes, paying different
levels of 12b-1 fees.25 To eliminate these fees would
restrict advisory firms’ ability to offer such a large
menu of choices; effectively, only share classes with
purely back-end or front-end loads would survive. A
reduction in the menu of pricing options would
undoubtedly make some investors worse off (that
is, they would prefer a share class that is no longer
offered). As argued above, the investment advice
and services supplied by the brokers would continue
to exist but would be paid for via different mecha-
nisms, such as fee-based financial advisers.
A practice that has also come under scrutiny and
may be facing potential elimination is the use of
soft-dollar brokerage agreements. While the total
brokerage payments are observable (implicitly as a
part of net performance and explicitly in a fund’s
Statement of Additional Information), the portion
of brokerage commissions that is being used to fund
non-trading-related activity is hidden from investors.
This issue is difficult to analyze especially because
so few statistics on soft-dollar payments and services
are available. But some inquiry into the economics
Market timing using mutual funds imposes
two types of costs on other shareholders,
and both such costs will hurt fund perfor-
mance in up markets.25. For an example of the comparison across share classes, see Reid and Rea (2003). Using standard assumptions on load and
12b-1 levels, C shares provide the highest annual return on holding periods of one to five years while A and B shares yield
higher net returns on horizons of seven to fifteen years.
26. The paper by Horan and Johnsen (2003), of which I recently became aware, is along these lines.
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research resources (for example, Bloomberg ter-
minals, independent research) would of course be
copied by all competitors, and the result would be
widespread usage of soft-dollar agreements. If this
is indeed the explanation, it is likely not the case
that soft-dollar agreements are inefficient or that
economic rents are accruing to the brokerage firm.
Provided there is competition for trade execution
and the majority of research resources can be com-
petitively supplied, brokerage firms will not earn
economic profit on the tied products and mutual
fund advisory firms will not be paying prices higher
than they would in a market where the services
were sold separately.
Perhaps this is not the economic story behind soft
dollars and it is price discrimination or entry deter-
rence that is driving the practice. I would welcome
data and analysis to differentiate among potential
explanations.26 The discussion here highlights the
need for an economically rigorous inquiry. The
answer to the question of whether investors would
gain from the elimination of soft dollars is not obvi-
ously affirmative. Moreover, this important question
is the first one a policymaker should answer when
contemplating proposed regulation and the first
question that an investor needs to answer in deciding
whether he would prefer to restrict his investment to
funds with no soft-dollar usage or only those that dis-
close their soft-dollar payments.
Monitoring and information disclosure.
Increased monitoring of agents by the principal is,
in addition to compensation, the other widely pre-
scribed solution to agency problems. Along this line,
other proposals call for increased disclosure by
advisory firms, including more frequent disclosure
of portfolio holdings, individual manager compensa-
tion, trading by managers, transactions costs, and
proxy voting. This increased disclosure would cer-
tainly provide investors with more information on
adviser activities. The increase in available informa-
tion is then presumed to result in increased moni-
toring of advisers by investors. Using this information,
each individual investor can enact his own implicit
compensation contract by directing his investment
allocations to the managers he prefers and away
from the managers he deems inferior. The aggre-
gate impact of these investor decisions will serve as
an implicit compensation contract with advisers,
one that reflects the assessments of investors on
average. These incentives will then discipline man-
agers from taking actions that are not in their
investors’ interests.
As with soft-dollar brokerage, the first question to
ask is whether the proposed disclosures will have any
benefit to investors. Will they in fact help to remedy
any of the conflicts of interest highlighted in the pre-
vious section? Certainly more complete information
on portfolio transactions would allow investors to
perform much more powerful tests to identify and
evaluate portfolio risks and attributes. To the extent
that investors then use this information to direct
their investments, such disclosures could help mini-
mize style tilting and risk shifting by portfolio advis-
ers. Disclosed proxy voting would indeed allow for
monitoring to confirm that funds are not voting
contrary to the interests of investors. Again, some
enforcement or punitive mechanism, such as investor
flow, would need to support such monitoring. It is
much less clear how disclosure of manager compen-
sation would directly aid in reducing conflicts of
interest. As noted above, manager compensation can
be expected to be correlated with advisory firm prof-
itability, so while there could be incentive effects
resulting from idiosyncratic aspects of manager com-
pensation, they are likely to be second-order. Finally,
fee information, to the extent that it is less variable
than security returns, could be helpful not in reduc-
ing conflicts of interest but in aiding investors in fore-
casting future net fund performance.
Once the magnitude of the benefit is established,
analysis turns to the cost of the monitoring.
Investment advisers typically cite the cost of dis-
semination as prohibitively expensive and note that
the cost will be borne by the fund management and,
ultimately, by shareholders. Certainly there are dis-
semination costs, which may be larger or smaller
The fact that no separation-based regulation
has been proposed is a welcome sign that reg-
ulatory authorities and legislators understand
that, when seeking to eliminate conflicts of
interest, some costs are not worth paying.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
Can increased disclosure be supplied by the pri-
vate market rather than mandated via regulation or
legislation? Put another way, even if increased disclo-
sure is deemed valuable, is there a need to write new
disclosure rules? Proponents of proposed regulation
argue that firms will not voluntarily disclose new
information and that some information already dis-
closed, such as fees, needs to be provided to investors
in a more useful format. But are these assertions
true? Is there no incentive for advisory firms to dis-
close new information valued by investors? Can the
private market not provide available information in
the packages most useful to investors?
In fact, a rich industry of information intermedi-
aries providing investors with data on mutual fund
performance and operating characteristics—
Morningstar, Lipper, Money magazine, etc.—already
exists. The influence of these firms extends beyond
their dedicated subscribers or users and into the
mainstream investor community via their propri-
etary mutual fund ratings that appear in advertise-
ments, software sold to financial advisers, and free
Web content. The main focus of these intermediaries
has been to distill and present the volumes of mutual
fund performance and style data into a form that is
valuable to individual investors. The results are style
boxes, star ratings, select lists, and fact sheets with
fund information presented in a graphically pleasing
manner. Over time, Morningstar in particular has
increased its fund information to include portfolio
holdings (voluntarily disclosed), subadviser infor-
mation, and fee breakdowns.
In the face of recent scandals, as more fund
advisers want to signal that they look out for share-
holder interests, the pressure will mount to supply
additional information. Indeed, we would expect
fund advisers of all stripes, not merely those that
have the cleanest record or set of practices, to
reveal information. A classic result from signaling
theory tells us that as long as there is a spectrum of
quality—in this case the amount of expropriating
activity by advisers—then all suppliers will reveal
their quality. Even advisers who fall into the middle
of the spectrum and do not follow all of the indus-
try best practices have an incentive to reveal infor-
mation (that is, allowing managers to trade funds
for their own account). Advisers choosing not to
reveal information would risk being lumped together
with the advisory firms that are the worst in the
eyes of the investing public. Indeed, many fund
complexes that are not under investigation have
issued statements to investors regarding their poli-
cies on market timing, late trading, and so forth.
And the firms that are under investigation are
depending on the particulars of the disclosure reg-
ulation (paper versus electronic, all shareholders
versus available to all shareholders, frequency, etc.).
But there are other costs to be concerned with.
With respect to portfolio disclosure, these buy-sell
decisions clearly represent the value-added of the
adviser, the very service he is selling. If too much
information about his strategy (to adopt a simple
term) is released, the strategy could be duplicable,
thus destroying much of the adviser’s human capi-
tal.27 Even if the strategy is not forecastable and
thus duplicable going forward, the possibility exists
of front running, trading ahead of adviser transac-
tions as they amass holdings over a period of time.
This problem is, of course, easily solved with lagged
disclosure at sufficiently low frequencies. Here, the
monitoring interests of the investors must be
weighed against the interests of the adviser as a
business enterprise. Notice also that it is not in an
investor’s best interest to have his portfolio front run.
What do investors really gain from the portfolio
disclosures, and what is the lowest frequency at
which these needs can reasonably be met? I do not
think that a credible case can be made that investors
would value portfolio disclosure on a daily or weekly
basis, for example. The case for quarterly disclosure
is much stronger. What is the optimal lag? Again, it
does not seem that investors need this information in
anywhere near real time to perform valuable moni-
toring of fund managers. If a major deviation in style,
say, does occur, investors will find out with a maxi-
mum lag of six months (if it is quarterly reporting plus
a quarter delay). One could argue that much damage
could be done in six months, but would it? Knowing
that investors will find out later disciplines advisers in
and of itself. In addition, investors already have at
their disposal daily net asset values for their funds.
Analysis of the fund’s return can identify the most
egregious changes in style or risk. Issues like these,
measuring costs and benefits, are central to an analy-
sis of any proposed regulation, but there is, I believe,
a more fundamental question regarding disclosure.
Brokers will strive to meet their customers’
demands just as retailers will pull products
that do not sell from the shelves and replace
them with products their customers prefer.27. See Myers et al. (2001) for estimates of the returns available on funds that mimic the transactions of actively managed
mutual funds.
28. See “Update from the Independent Trustees of the Janus Funds” at ww3.janus.com. 
29. Interestingly, not all advisers surveyed submitted responses, but in many cases the lack of response could be due to the short
time frame allowed for answering the survey. But I would expect the number of nonresponders to drop, at least among the
firms that receive a substantial amount of revenue from retail mutual funds. 
30. See Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Beatty, Bunsis, and Hand (1998) for studies of reputation losses due to SEC enforcement.
31. To argue that investors do not have power in such a market requires the documentation of market frictions or barriers to
capital mobility that stop investors from allocating their money to the preferred funds. Such a barrier does exist in the form
of a capital gains tax on mutual fund redemptions. But this friction is likely to be less important than one might think. While
investors may be hesitant to redeem shares because of tax liabilities, they can always begin allocating their stream of future
investments to different funds. Nonetheless, eliminating the tax on mutual fund investment would increase investors’ power.
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releasing detailed reports to investors on their own
internal investigations.28 This disclosure is moti-
vated by business interests, not regulation.
To be sure, much of this information is costly to
collect and aggregate, but we are already seeing evi-
dence that there are gains to doing so. Both Money
magazine and TheStreet.com have conducted sur-
veys of advisory firms concerning their governance
and operating practices, and the results are promi-
nently displayed and analyzed in their publications
and on Web sites.29 Even more recently, Morningstar
has added Fund Fiduciary ranking, which assesses
a variety of fund governance practices. In addition,
organizations such as the Social Investment Forum
have aggregated information, including proxy vot-
ing records and investment screening criteria, for a
large number of socially responsible mutual funds.
Investors who value this information do not have to
incur the costs of finding and aggregating the infor-
mation themselves.
The pressure that motivates such voluntary dis-
closure is individuals’ willingness to withdraw or
redirect assets away from advisers with poor gover-
nance, disclosure, and operational practices. Any
additional penalty the capital market asserts on
publicly traded advisory firms is really just a market
assessment of the ultimate discipline that investors
will exert.30 Faced with these penalties, advisory
firms have an incentive to disclose information and
change to practices or fee structures that investors
want. Thus, the likelihood of voluntary disclosure is
dependent on the actions of individual investors.
Many have argued, and the SEC seems to act
under the assumption, that individual investors need
to be protected via strong regulation while such
protection is not necessary for more sophisticated
investors such as hedge fund clients. This view
implies that investors require the SEC to monitor
and discipline mutual fund advisers in ways they
cannot. With respect to proposed rules mandating
disclosure, this position seems self-contradictory.
The power of any disclosure, regulated or voluntary,
relies on the ability of individual investors to use
the disclosed information to penalize firms. Thus,
it cannot be argued that regulated disclosure is
necessary because investors will not sufficiently
discipline managers of their own accord. Unless the
regulation also includes rules on actions and poli-
cies, and a high degree of agency monitoring and
enforcement of such rules, it will rely solely on
investor action. In other words, if we truly believe
that individual investors will not discipline man-
agers, then even mandated disclosure is not likely
to change the behavior of advisers or the price of
advisory services.
Therefore, the question of how investors wield
their power is key to the debate over whether addi-
tional regulation is necessary and, if so, what form
it should take. If investors are deemed unable to
take action in their own best interests, then we are
led to policies that not only mandate adviser behav-
ior but dictate investor behavior as well. If, on the
other hand, investors are capable of making deci-
sions that promote their own interests, then addi-
tional regulation is largely unnecessary. The next
section presents evidence on investor decision mak-
ing, how investors use their power to influence
adviser behavior, and some interpretations of these
findings for policy.
The Power of Investors
I
nvestors, as demanders of advisory services, can
pressure advisers to deliver the services they pre-
fer at prices they are willing to pay. The mutual
fund industry is, in this sense, no different than any
other competitive industry. Individual consumers
exert their power via their aggregated purchasing
decisions in a marketplace replete with choices. As
of 2002, some 7,267 equity and bond mutual funds
are available to investors, offered by 431 different
fund complexes (ICI 2001a, 2003). While invest-
ment styles and objectives differ, each niche offers
ample choice to U.S. investors.31 In such a market-
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group. Thus, the effect of performance on flow is
persistent and not limited to the most recent month
or year of returns. The relation between perfor-
mance and flow is also very strong in the cross-
section, suggesting that flow provides important
economic incentives for fund advisers.33
Thus, net performance matters to investors, but
do they pay explicit attention to fees? Barber, Odean,
and Zheng (2002) study equity funds and find that
flows in their sample are negatively and significantly
related to loads but not significantly related to
expense ratios. This finding is echoed in Del Guercio
and Tkac (2003), who find that expense ratios, 12b-1
fees, and the existence of a load are not related to
the abnormal flow experienced by funds that change
Morningstar rating groups. As a whole, investors
appear to be somewhat vigilant with respect to the
load component of fees but seemingly ignore
expense ratios in that they do not allocate more
flow to funds with lower expense ratios.
This characterization of investors as rewarding
performance without penalizing risk and having a
willing ignorance of fee levels implies that investors,
in aggregate, are not using their allocations to give
advisers, in aggregate, an incentive to reduce fees
or keep portfolios aligned to their stated style.
Instead, advisers appear to have an incentive to
post good performance and beat rival funds and to
have the freedom to maintain or raise fees. Some
researchers have interpreted these findings as evi-
dence that mutual funds investors are wielding eco-
nomically significant power but seemingly not to
their best advantage; high-fee funds are not being
punished with outflows while the worst performers
continue to retain investment assets. Indeed, the
very reliance on performance is at odds with the
academic literature on performance persistence
(see Carhart 1997). Such a reading of the data would
argue that regulation is needed to protect investors
from themselves.
But there is another, more reasoned, interpreta-
tion of the evidence that reaches a very different
conclusion. The academic evidence represents a
bird’s eye view of the industry, a view that masks
considerable heterogeneity across investors, decision-
making costs, and important institutional details in
the investment allocation process. For example,
several attempts have been made to explain the lack
of punishment of poorly performing funds. Among
the proposed explanations are that tax lock-in effects
cause investors to shift new allocations while not
closing out poor fund positions and the observation
that poorly performing funds are the ones most likely
to change strategy and experience a performance
guide the invisible hand of the market for invest-
ment services.
The important empirical questions are, how and
to what extent do investors exercise this power? In
other words, which fund characteristics influence
investor flow, and how homogenous are investors in
their decision making? Fund characteristics that
guide flow will create a scheme of implicit incen-
tives for fund advisers through the asset-based fee
structure. The degree of homogeneity of investor
decision making determines the power of investors,
in aggregate, to induce economically powerful
incentives. The more investors agree on a desirable
portfolio attribute, the more flow will accrue to funds
possessing that attribute and the more advisers will
lose when not providing that attribute.
How do individual investors allocate their invest-
ment capital? The academic literature on fund flows
is replete with papers demonstrating that mutual
fund investors respond strongly to past fund per-
formance.32 More specifically, net flow to equity
funds is positively related to raw returns and popu-
lar rating measures, such as Morningstar star ratings,
and unrelated to risk measures such as tracking
error (see Del Guercio and Tkac 2003, 2002). As
first noted by Sirri and Tufano (1998), one of the
most well known features of this relation between
flow and performance is that funds at the bottom of
the performance spectrum in any year experience
little if any net outflow while funds performing
above the 90th percentile receive large amounts of
net inflow. More recent work tracks flows to indi-
vidual funds over time and finds that investors exert
economically significant penalties (that is, outflows)
on funds that decline in performance while reward-
ing funds that experience performance upgrades
with additional flow (Del Guercio and Tkac 2003).
The positive effect from performance improvement,
similar to that in Sirri and Tufano, is found in funds
that “win the tournament,” but there seems to be no
economically significant punishment for a slight
decline once a fund has been in this esteemed
The question of whether investors would gain
from the elimination of soft dollars is the first
one a policymaker should answer when con-
templating proposed regulation.32. For some examples, see Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Ippolito (1992), Patel, Zeckhauser, and
Hendricks (1994), and Gruber (1996).
33. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that roughly 51 percent of the variation in dollar flows across funds is due to recent
performance and lagged fund flow. Lagged fund flow is correlated with performance farther in the past. 
34. Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) report that 25 percent of S&P 500 index funds have an expense ratio greater than 59 basis
points, a level commensurate with active management, and 41 basis points higher than Vanguard’s well-publicized ratio of
18 basis points.
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boost (see Lynch and Musto 2003). Finally, note that
a reallocation of new contributions among long-term
investors who are net buyers will decrease the weight
of these poorly performing funds in an investor’s
portfolio and minimize any potential opportunity
costs of reallocation. These alternatives indicate
that there are valid institutional reasons why
investors might behave the way they do and why
their behavior might not be suboptimal.
A fundamental influence on investor decision
making is the presence of decision and search costs.
Current research along these lines formally models
the distribution of search costs across investors in
the S&P 500 index fund market (see Hortaçsu and
Syverson 2004). This subset of funds is particularly
interesting because index funds are perfectly sub-
stitutable. Thus, the dispersion observed in fees,
and hence performance, is somewhat puzzling. Why
would an investor pay an additional 40 or 50 basis
points for the same portfolio services?34 Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2004) find that reasonable magni-
tudes of search costs can explain the observed price
dispersion. Interestingly, their empirical estimates
of search costs increase over the sample period, a
result that they attribute to the recent entry of
mutual fund investors with less expertise and higher
decision costs.
Similarly important to the analysis is the hetero-
geneity within the population of mutual fund
investors. They are indeed a varied group: 59 percent
use financial advisers while 13 percent consult rating
services. In addition, 52 percent of mutual fund share-
holders primarily hold funds on their own while
48 percent of shareholders hold them through retire-
ment plans. Of the former group, 71 percent buy
through broker-dealers while 29 percent purchase
shares directly from fund companies (see ICI 2001b,
1997). Many investors are responsive to fees, use
sophisticated financial analysis to risk-adjust fund
performance, or put all their money in Vanguard S&P
500 Index Trust (as recommended by academics
nationwide). Some investors are more educated in
finance and economics and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, have a preference for spending their leisure
time increasing and practicingtheir investment-related
skills. Other investors have heard the message of fund
companies everywhere that saving for retirement
is important and mutual funds are a good way to
achieve that goal. But these less knowledgeable
investors have little investment expertise and are
unwilling to acquire more perhaps because they are
up against time constraints or are just uninterested in
the details. This latter group, quite possibly the bulk
of the mutual fund investing public, may be either
unaware of the opportunity cost of altering their
investment patterns or unwilling to devote resources
to change. Either way, however, such a decision is
rational given their set of information and skills.
This heterogeneity across investors can also help
explain their behavior with respect to fees. In S&P
500 index funds, the difference in fees across funds
is mainly due to differences in 12b-1 fees (see Elton,
Gruber, and Busse 2004). As noted earlier, these
fees largely go to brokers as compensation for fund
sales and distribution. So the differences in S&P
500 index funds are real and reside not in the gross
performance of the portfolio but rather in the dis-
tribution channel through which the fund is offered.
The investors paying 12b-1 fees and loads for S&P
500 index funds are receiving more advice and
information than do investors in direct-marketed,
no-load funds. I find it hard to believe that these
investors know that other lower-fee options are
available and prefer them but are choosing not to
take advantage of them. The brokers’ expertise and
handholding are clearly a service that some
investors value. Multiple share classes and 12b-1
fees facilitate the purchase of these additional ser-
vices. For investors who do not value such services,
the no-load, low-fee funds in the market provide a
In the face of recent scandals, as more fund
advisers want to signal that they look out for
shareholder interests, the pressure will mount
to supply additional information.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
This trend suggests that (1) some investors care about
the allegations of wrongdoing and (2) they will move
their money to firms they find more trustworthy.36
Armed with this knowledge of investor behavior,
we turn back to the issue of disclosure. Would
investors value more information about mutual
fund operations and activities? First, consider how
various investor types would use this information.
Additional disclosure of soft-dollar brokerage, port-
folio holdings, and proxy votes would likely not
directly affect the investment decisions of the
majority of investors. They rely on and pay financial
advisers or brokers for processing such information
and formulating guidance regarding fund allocation.
A slightly more interested or financially astute
group of investors would also not be likely to use
the raw information directly but would be willing to
pay for information aggregated and distilled by an
intermediary, such as Morningstar or Money maga-
zine. The most interested individuals would per-
haps use the disclosed data in raw form, but this
group would surely be the minority of investors.
Therefore, it appears that no real demand exists for
new forms of information other than that already
being disclosed (for example, fees in dollar terms,
brokerage costs in documents other than the
Statement of Additional Information). This informa-
tion, to the extent that it is used by most investors,
is processed via intermediaries, be they brokers or
information intermediaries. The private market
seems well equipped to provide investors with the
form of information they find most useful.
Investors might value disclosure of previously
unobservable information if it helps to reduce the
conflicts of interest highlighted earlier. Thus, a
case could be made that investors would value
disclosure of portfolio holdings to aid in monitor-
ing risk as well as proxy voting. But, as discussed
earlier, it is unclear that regulations to mandate
such disclosure would be the optimal solution.
The best indicator of the value of information is to
see whether it is being supplied in the market. If
investors as a group put a high value on such
information and were willing to move investment
allocations based on disclosure or the contents of
the disclosure, fund advisers would find it in their
best interests to supply the information. The fact
that most funds have not voluntarily disclosed
proxy and holdings information suggests that
investors are not demanding disclosure. This
behavior is not necessarily hard to understand. An
estimate of the proposed restoration of market
timing damages by Janus funds amounts to $31.5
million in total but only “one cent or more” per
preferable alternative. In the mutual fund market as
a whole, then, it is not surprising that fund flows are
not negatively correlated with fees. As investors
sort themselves based on their demand for invest-
ment advice, there will be a market for funds with
fees at all levels.
Overall, I find nothing in the data consistent with
the view that investors are irrational or in some
other sense cannot look out for their own best inter-
ests. Rather, the mutual fund industry looks like
many other industries that provide a variety of
products and pricing structures to meet heteroge-
neous consumer preferences and budgets. It is not
unlike the automotive industry in this respect. Not
everyone drives the car with the lowest total oper-
ating cost. Consumers who prefer more style, fea-
tures, or power willingly pay higher prices to drive
the cars of their choice. The price-sensitive drivers
do indeed purchase the low-cost, no-frills models.
In aggregate, we would not expect there to be pres-
sure on all car makers to reduce their prices and
would not think of suggesting regulation that would
interfere with market prices. Analogously, on the
question of mutual fund fees, I do not view it as a
problem that fees are at the levels they are; it merely
represents the functioning of a relatively free market.
Some direct, though rough, evidence on investor
rationality can also be found in the flow response to
the announcement of market timing investigations
and charges last fall. Several of the firms implicated
experienced economically significant outflows over
the five months following the allegations. Among
those most hard hit are Putnam, Janus, and Invesco
(AIM), with net outflows from equity and fixed
income mutual funds of $24 billion, $12 billion, and
$6 billion, respectively.35 Such market discipline has
the power to deter future misconduct. Given an
average industry management fee of 1.5 percent,
these firms have lost approximately $63 million of
revenue this year alone. And a large portion of this
revenue appears to have accrued to firms with clean
records such as Vanguard, Fidelity, and American.
The power of any disclosure, regulated or
voluntary, relies on the ability of individual
investors to use the disclosed information 
to penalize firms.35. Data (as of March 2004) on fund flows by complex can be found at www.frcnet.com.
36. These flows represent mutual fund assets and do not include outflows resulting from withdrawal of institutional assets. In
many cases these additional outflows are substantial as corporations and pension funds assess their potential liability from
continuing relationships with firms under investigation.
37. Updates are available from the Independent Trustees of the Janus Funds at ww3.janus.com.
19 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
share.37 With such a low value per investor, is it
any wonder that investors do not find it worth the
time and effort to monitor?
The onus on regulators proposing to monitor
funds on behalf of investors is to demonstrate that
governmental monitoring and enforcement is some-
how more efficient than monitoring by individual
investors. If individuals are not willing to pay with
their own time and energy to monitor, the only way
regulation can make them better off is if it can deliver
value at a lower cost. But it is difficult to see how this
could be the case. Mandatory disclosure imposes
costs on all funds and all investors, even those who
do not value disclosure. Moreover, mandated disclo-
sure by its very nature cannot respond to the evolving
informational demands of investors. Each regulatory
change requires a thorough review and study by the
SEC and countless hours spent by interested parties
in researching the proposals and submitting com-
ments. Layered over these costs is the ever-present
drive for firms to lobby for regulation that will bene-
fit them at the expense of their competitors. Such
rent seeking wastes resources and contributes to the
relative inefficiency of a regulatory solution.
Conclusion
O
verall then, the answer to the question posed in
the title of the paper, “temporary problem or
permanent morass?” is yes. Mutual funds pose a
temporary problem with respect to the current
market timing and late trading charges. These par-
ticular forms of misconduct will largely be
addressed via legal remedies and market discipline
and are unlikely to occur again in the foreseeable
future. Along these lines, there have been signifi-
cant reallocations of assets away from firms that
have engaged in these activities and into funds of
firms who have clean records. The penalties to be
paid in settlements with the SEC and various state
attorneys general raise the cost of future violations
while the increased investor focus and attention on
manager actions increase the probability of discov-
ery. The very occurrence of the scandal will likely
prompt increased scrutiny by investors of all types,
both individual and institutional. This scrutiny,
along with the now higher expected cost of miscon-
duct, will temper the behavior of advisory firms
even in the absence of new regulations.
In the long run, however, mutual funds are a
permanent morass. There will never be complete
alignment of advisers’ and investors’ interests. In
this respect, mutual funds are no different than any
other service. There will always be a conflict
between the profitability goals of producers and
their customers, who wish to maximize their own
surplus. This conflict is inherent in any interaction
that involves the delegation of tasks and specializa-
tion of labor. The only way to eliminate such con-
flicts is a return to a world in which investors build
and manage their own individual portfolios. This
option is indeed available to investors right now.
The fact that few (11 percent according to ICI)
choose self-management over mutual fund invest-
ment is testament to the extraordinary gains from
specialization and scale that mutual investment
offers. Certainly no one would suggest that mutual
funds be regulated out of existence because of the
risk of misconduct by advisory firms. Since we are
unwilling then to reduce risk to zero, the question
becomes, what can be done to minimize the poten-
tial for conflict?
The best solution to such an agency problem is a
pool of effective monitors armed with observable
information on manager actions and activities. But
who should these monitors be: boards of directors
or investors themselves? And how should they get
their information: through regulated disclosure or
private market forces? These fundamental questions
are at the heart of any policy debate.
I am of the opinion that investors are best viewed
as customers of mutual fund services, so by far the
strongest weapon investors have is their own
demand. When unfettered and free of frictions, a
competitive marketplace will supply the products
When unfettered and free of frictions, a com-
petitive marketplace will supply the products
and services investors demand at the lowest
possible price.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
price level for investor services that includes not
only portfolio management but also investment
advice, convenience, expertise, and attaining a level
of comfort.
In such a private market setting, investors them-
selves can decide which risks are worth monitoring
more aggressively and which, while present, are not
worth their time and energy. Moreover, as advisory
firms compete to satisfy investors, the financial land-
scape will evolve. And a private market for informa-
tion about managers is able to evolve with the speed
and effectiveness that regulation cannot achieve.
and services investors demand at the lowest possi-
ble price. With their power, investors can prompt
advisory firms not only to offer funds in styles they
prefer but also to disclose more information on
portfolio holdings, proxy votes, soft-dollar arrange-
ments, and anything else they feel would aid in
monitoring a manager’s actions. Much has been
made of the high level of fees paid to advisory firms.
But fees are not a conflict of interest except in the
trivial sense: Firms would like to charge more and
investors would like to pay less. The market inter-
action between the two groups sets an efficient
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